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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
POST EXPIRATION ROYALTY PAYMENTS AND
MANDATORY PACKAGE LICENSING
AS PATENT MISUSES
I.
Misuse IN GENERAL
A. Theoretical Basis
Our economic philosophy of free competition is reflected by a legal
system prohibiting monopolistic forms of enterprise; yet, a patent grants
a monopoly over the use of the patented invention. This exception to the
nation's anti-monopolistic jurisprudence has been delimited to a scope
commensurate with its unique characteristics. The doctrine of patent mis-
use has been developed to curtail extension of the patent power beyond
the limited monopoly granted. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co.' initiated the development. The Court held that a restric-
tion on the sale of a patented projection machine, allowing only films in
which the patentee had an interest to be used with the machine, was an
abuse of the patent grant. The Court reasoned that since the patentee's
monopoly was limited by the coverage of the patent claims, any further
economic regulation came within the area of general law prohibiting monop-
olies. Thus, the attempted restriction on the use of the machine, the at-
tempted "tie-in" of the films with the patented machine was a patent misuse.
Besides "tie-in" cases, such as Motion Picture, the misuse theory
proscribes any device by which the patentee endeavors to extend the scope
of his patent so as to control some object, patented or not, which lies
beyond the patent grant. 2 Post-expiration royalty payments and mandatory
package licensing, the two patent arrangements discussed in this comment,
are therefore prohibited.8
1. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
2. For a general introduction to the misuse doctrine and its antitrust aspect, see
OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 755-912 (1959) ; REPORT OP THE
ATT'Y GEN'LS NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 223-60 (1955).
3. The collection of royalty payments for the use of a patented article, after the
patent has expired, was declared a misuse in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
Mandatory package licensing has also been condemned. American Securit Co. v.
Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
(1) Price restrictions combined with cross-licensing agreements. United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). See Farley, Price Fixing and
Royalty Provisions in Patent Licenses, 34 J. PAT. OFr. Soc'Y 46 (1952).
(2) Grant-back agreements made with the purpose of violating antitrust policy.
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1947).
See generally Simmons, Antitrust Aspects of Grant Back Clauses in License
Agreements, 41 J. PAT. OFV. Soc'v 574 (1959).
(3) Patent-pooling or cross licensing with the purpose of violating the antitrust
system. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963). See Com-
ment, 20 U. PITT. L. RPv. 54 (1958).
(4) Certain restrictions placed on a sale of the patented article. E.g., United States
v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
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B. Practical Consequences
Three basic consequences may ensue from a finding that the owner
has misused his patent. First, since a misuse is without the protection of
the patent grant, it may be a violation of the antitrust laws.4 The leasing
of patented tabulating machines upon the condition that only the lessor's
tabulating cards be used, a situation legally indistinguishable from the
Motion Picture case, has been adjudged an antitrust violation. 5
Secondly, a determination that a patentee's license contract contains
such a price fixing device which misuses his patent allows the licensee an
exception from the rule of licensee estoppel. 6 This exception is limited to
situations where the covenant to pay royalties cannot be severed from the
illegal misuse provisions in the contract. The exception then proceeds on
the rationale that a court cannot give effect to an illegal contract. Since the
provisions are not severable, the whole contract is illegal and so cannot
serve to estop the licensee from contesting the patent's validity.
The third, and perhaps the most penalizing, effect of a misuse adjudi-
cation lies in its potential invocation as a defense in either an infringement
suit or an action for royalty payments. The Supreme Court's opinion in
the Motion Picture7 case arose from an infringement action by the patentee
against the buyer of his patented machine who had refused to accede to the
limitation requiring buyers to use only particular films with the machine.
The Court denounced this limitation and denied relief even though the
buyer, by the contract of sale, had assented to the plaintiff's conditions.
This refusal of patent enforcement is based on an application of the equitable
maxim, "clean hands." A patentee who abuses his privilege is a wrong-
doer and cannot acquire the aid of equity.
These three penalties remain effective until the patentee "purges"
himself of the misuse.8 For an effective purge, the patentee must not only
4. While every patent use which violates the antitrust laws is a misuse since a
monopoly beyond the rightfully obtained patent grant is by definition a misuse, the
converse proposition, that every patent misuse transgresses the antitrust laws, is
rejected by some authority. E.g., RSORT OV TH AT'rY GENL'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY
THS ANTITRUST LAWS 254 (1955) ; Harris & Seigel, Evolving Court Opinion on
Patent Licensing: An Interaction of Positive Competition and the Law, 5 PTC J.
Rts. & ED. 103, 106 (1961) ; contra, Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regula-
tor Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944) (dictum).
5. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936). Section 3
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 14 (1963), was applicable. It should be noted that this
section specifically regulates either "patented or unpatented" goods.
6. Edward Katziuger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947),(this case presented an express provision in the licensing agreement not to contest the
patents) ; MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947) ; Sola
Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) ; Nachman Spring-Filled Corp.
v. Kay Mfg. Co., 139 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1943).
7. Supra note 1.
8..... [T]he courts will not aid a patent owner who has misused his patents
to recover any of their emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or there-
after until the effects of such misuse have been dissipated or 'purged' as the con-
ventional saying goes.
United States Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957).
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cease the illegal practice, but must dissipate all effects of the misuse. Only
then is a patent owner allowed to invoke licensee estoppel and able to sue
for royalties and infringement.
II.
POST-EXPIRATION ROYALTY PAYMENTS - A MISUSE
In addition to using the patented device himself, a patent owner may
license another party to use, make or sell his invention. Royalty payments
are specified in the licensing contract as consideration for this permission.
However, any royalties payable as consideration for the use of a patented
article after that patent has expired constitute a misuse.
A. History, A Misuse Evolving
1. The Traditional Rule
Extension of the misuse doctrine by. favorable court application is
typified by this development. Judicial disfavor had been cast upon the
practice of charging royalty payments after the patent's lapse until it ulti-
mately has been declared a misuse. Traditionally, a licensee could collect
royalties after the seventeen-year statutory monopoly if an intention to so
provide could be fairly inferred from the contract. The contract language
which expressed this as the parties' intention was said to rebut the pre-
sumption that royalty payments were not intended after the patent's termi-
nation. But, in the early cases construing this rule, 9 the courts were not
discussing patent misuse, the present problem, and no intention of continued
royalty payments was ever found.' 0 Though this type of patent exploitation
was not considered a misuse, it was the object of strong judicial reprimand.
However, the misuse theory was growing and courts were becoming
more conscious of the potential power of patentees to exceed their limited
grant; judges began to criticize these licensing agreements as contrary to
the patent philosophy. Four circuit courts," while not presented with a
9. The leading cases appear to be: E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Chemical Foundation,
Inc., 93 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1920) ; Sproull v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 108 Fed. 963 (2d
Cir. 1901).
Other cases following the traditional law: Starke v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank,
174 F. Supp. 882, aff'd, 283 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D. Mich. 1954); H-P-M Development
Corp. v. Watson-Stillman Co., 71 F. Supp. 906 (D.N.J. 1947); Dwight & Lloyd
Sintering Co. v. American Ore Reclamation Co., 44 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) ;
Lathrop v. Rice & Adams Corp., 17 F. Supp. 622 (W.D.N.Y. 1936) ; Bettis Rubber
Co. v. Kleaver, 104 Cal. App. 2d 821, 233 P.2d 82 (1951).
10. The one exception to this statement is Adams v. Dyer, 129 Cal. App. 2d 160,
276 P.2d 186 (1954). However, the court applied straight contract law; it neither
cited any patent authority nor considered the misuse issue.
11. American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769, 777 (3d
Cir. 1959) ; Prestole Corp. v. Tinnerman Prod., Inc., 271 F.2d 146, 154 (6th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960) ; Scapa Dryers, Inc. v. Abney Mills, 269
F.2d 6, 13-14 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d
550, 573 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950).
To the same effect are Tinnerman Prod., Inc. v. George K. Garrett Co., 185 F.
Supp. 151, 157-58 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 292 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1961) ; April Prod. v.
Schirmer, Inc., 308 N.Y. 366, 126 N.E.2d 283 (1955).
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case on point, agreed that "such a provision, however, might easily lead
itself to an unreasonable restraint of trade by extending patents beyond
their proper limits.'
12
2. The Ar-Tik Case
When the precise issue was litigated in Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy
Queen, Inc.,13 the predictable result, declaring post-expiration royalties a
misuse, was reached. Plaintiff, the owner of a patent covering a frozen
dessert machine brought suit against a sub-licensee for royalties due after
the lapse of the patent; the licensing contract stated that the royalty would
continue "regardless of the expiration of the patent."' 4 The Third Circuit,
rejecting the old rule, declared that the leading cases were dicta since the
required intention to pay royalties subsequent to patent termination had
never been found; demonstrated that the trend was against such contracts;
and finally, declared the practice a misuse. Authority for the decision was
derived from Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co.,15 a Supreme Court opinion,
with further reliance placed on cases which contained dicta criticizing
the practice. 16
The Scott Paper case had held that an assignor was not estopped from
denying the validity of the assigned patent, as would be the usual rule,
when he asserts that the accused device is a copy of an expired patent.
Reliance on a decision involving assignor-estoppel as a basis for condemn-
ing post-expiration royalties appears to be rather tenuous. However, the
underlying philosophies are identical; patents become public property upon
expiration of the statutory monopoly and any device which thereafter
continues control over the invention is illegal.' 7
3. The Brulotte Case
Ar-Tik, by its refusal to follow past law, divided the contemporary
law. In an attempt to resolve the conflicting decisions,' the Supreme Court
granted a petition for certiorari by a licensee who bad been held responsible
for paying royalties, 19 even though all the patents had expired. The Court,
12. Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550, 573 (4th Cir. 1950).
13. 305 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1959).
14. The contract provided:
All sublicenses granted by (defendant's licensor) shall contain a provision
obligating the sublicensee to pay to Ar-Tik Systems, Incorporated, (a specified
royalty) on all mix used in the machines built during said patent number, said
royalty to continue during the life of the machines regardless of the expiration
of the patent....
Appendix to Brief for Appellant, p. 114a.
15. 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
16. See note 11, supra.
17. "[A]ny attempted reservation or continuation in the patentee or those claim-
ing under him of the patent monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal
device employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws." Id. at 256.
18. E.g., McLeod v. Crawford, 176 Neb. 513, 126 N.W.2d 663 (1964), (refusing
to follow Ar-Tik) ; Contra, Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Bendix Aviation
Corp., 218 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1963).
19. Thys Co. v. Brulotte, 62 Wash. 2d 284, 382 P.2d 271 (1963).
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citing the Ar-Tik case, reversed.20 The defendant, buyer of a patented
hop-picking machine had refused to make the royalty payments stipulated
in his license. This license, though given with the sale, was completely
separate from it; the purchase price was an initial flat sum, and the buyer
obtained the title to the machine. The license, specified regular annual pay-
ments which were to continue beyond the expiration date of the licensed
patents and provided that the agreement should remain in force "irrespec-
tive of the expiration date of any Letters Patent hereinbefore listed."'21
No differentiation in the amount of royalty payments was made between
the pre- and post-expiration periods. Another provision of the contract
prevented assignment of the machines or their removal from the county
after, as well as before, the termination dates of the patents.
These stipulations in the contract were considered crucial by the Court
in deciding that the license was being used to extend the patent monopoly
beyond the statutory period. They showed a "bald attempt to exact the
same terms and conditions for the period after the patents have expired
as they do for the monopoly period" 22 and, consequently, the Court con-
cluded "that a patentee's use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond
the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se."2
B. Prediction - An Unenforceable Prospect
Conceptually, the Brulotte decision is totally justified. Conditioning
the patent license upon the licensee's agreement to pay royalties for the
use of the patent after, as well as before, the patent grant ends is a misuse,
an attempt to control something not within the patent.
Practically, however, the decision presents serious difficulty. The
owner of a patent is permitted to exact as high a price as he wishes for
the use of his patent.24 Such a price may take the form of the purchase
cost of a patented machine 25 or royalties charged for the use of the
patented article. Certainly, no prohibition exists which would forbid the
patent owner from collecting his price in installments.
How, then, is a court to distinguish deferred purchase price payments,
some of which are due after the patent expires, from an unlawful exaction
20. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
21. The agreement stated:
Title to the said machines shall rest . . . on delivery . . . but the resting (of
title) ... shall not (be a) license ... to use . .. and to practice the methods
and processes disclosed and claimed in Letters Patent hereinbefore listed and
related thereto. The term of the license granted ...shall be from the date first
above written until completion of the 1958 harvest, irrespective of the date of
expiration of any Letters Patent hereinbefore listed.
Brief for Petitioners, pp. 5-6.
22. 379 U.S. at 32.
23. Ibid.
24. The Brulotte case itself says "A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties
as high as he can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly." 379 U.S. at 33.
Accord, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
25. An implied license is given, which allows the use of a patented article when
that article is sold by the patentee or someone under him. E.g., Adams v. Burke,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
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of royalties on the article subsequent to the patent's termination? Perhaps
a more difficult problem is presented when royalty payments, applicable
during the patent period, are deferred until after that period expires.
A skillful contract draftsman will simply avoid any allusions to royalties
when referring to the post-expiration period and designate any post-
expiration payments deferred installments.2 6 Yet, the total amount and
even the time of collection will coincide with that of post-expiration royal-
ties. Form, not substance, will be the criterion. Mr. Justice Harlan, the
sole dissenter, recognized this obstacle and pondered whether "the Court
is basing its decision on the technical drawing of the contract." 27
The unique character of a patent has always permitted the patentee to
negotiate any price he wished2 8 and installment contracts, providing a con-
venient means of payment, have thus become a necessity. These two prin-
ciples cannot be changed. Given these, no way can be found to prevent cir-
cumvention of Brulotte's condemnation of contracts providing for post-ex-
piration royalty payments by utilizing legitimate deferred payment contracts.
III.
MANDATORY PACKAGE LICENSING - A MIsusE
The licensing of more than one of the licensor's patents for a single
royalty has been termed package licensing. A refusal to license less than
such a package transforms this practice into a misuse; where the licensee
voluntarily assents to accept a package, no misuse occurs. 29
A. History - A Misuse Evolving
1. The Paramount Case
Oddly enough, the initial case in the historical development of this
patent misuse involved the copyright rather than the patent area. The
Supreme Court found an antitrust violation in "block booking," that is,
refusing to license one copyrighted movie unless others are accepted and
shown, in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.80 Patent misuse
cases as well as copyright decisions were relied upon,3 1 thus indicating
26. The contract in the Brulotte case had been interpreted by the Washington
Supreme Court to call for installment payments of the purchase price. 62 Wash. 2d
284, 291, 382 P.2d 271, 275 (1963). However the United States Supreme Court dis-
agreed with this construction and reversed.
The Washington courts had also used that interpretation of the contract so as to
allow the state to impose a sales tax on the Brulotte-Thys transaction. 31 Wash. 2d
739, 199 P.2d 68 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 950 (1949).
27. 397 U.S. at 38.
28. Supra note 24.
29. See Burns, Does Package Licensing of Patents Violate the Antitrust Laws?,
41 J. PAT. Opp. Soc'y 259 (1959) ; Note, 44 VA. L. Riv. 727 (1958).
30. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
31. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Invest. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) ; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
COMMENTS
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that the Court's opinion was based on principles broad enough to cover
both fields.
While the mandatory package licensing of patents had not been pro-
claimed illegal by Paramount, a clear judicial warning emerged. The
Attorney General's Antitrust Committee relied on this case to condemn
coerced package licensing8 2 and courts, while not faced with the exact issue,
relied on Paramount to critize the practice by way of dictum.83
2. The Hazeltine Case
The next Supreme Court pronouncement on this patent arrangement
was Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.3 4  While
coercion was averred in the district court, the argument was not pressed
in the Court of Appeals3 5 or in the Supreme Court.36 Consequently, the
only question ultimately decided by the Court was whether plaintiff-
research corporation's scheme of licensing its patents in a package to the
defendant manufacturer for a royalty based on defendant's sales was
a misuse per se.
Mr. Justice Minton, for the majority, stated that the agreement was
included in the patentee's "right to market the use of the patent at a rea-
sonable return"3 7 and therefore was legal. The fact that less than all the
patents in the package were used by the manufacturer was considered
irrelevant because royalties are consideration for the right to use the patent,
not for the use itself.
In Hazeltine, the package licensing arrangement was held valid, 38 yet
the question of mandatory package licensing was expressly left undecided.
However, a hostile attitude toward mandatory packaging may be observed
States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). While this last decision involved licensing restrictions
rather than package licensing, very broad language was used: "The patent monopoly
of one invention may no more be enlarged for the exploitation of a monopoly of
another . .. than for the exploitation of an unpatented article." 309 U.S. at 459.
32. REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN'Ls NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY TH4 ANTITRUST
LAWS 239 (1955).
33. E.g., Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550, 569-73
(4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950).
34. 339 U.S. 827 (1950) ; See 17 BROOKLYN L. Rtv. 155 (1951).
35. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 176 F.2d 799, 805 (1st
Cir. 1949).
36. 339 U.S. at 831.
37. Id. at 833.
38. The defendant in Hazeltine also argued that the system of measuring plaintiff's
royalties by a fixed percentage of the defendant's sales was a misuse and therefore
a defense to plaintiff's action for royalties. The Court held that such a scheme is not
illegal per se; it was not an "inherent extension of the patent monopoly." Id. at 834.
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, disagreed. "The patent owner has therefore used
the patents to bludgeon his way into a partnership with this licensee, collecting royalties
on unpatented as well as patented articles." Id. at 838. See Harmon, Antitrust and
Misuse Implications of the Defined Field License, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 463, 480-
87 (1963).
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in dicta in that case. "These cases [i.e., the Paramount case] have con-
demned schemes ... conditioning the granting of a license under one patent
upon the acceptance of another and different license."3 9 It should be noted
that the Court was using the Paramount copyright case in the patent area.
3. The Securit Case
The foreseeable condemnation 40 of the practice of coercing licensees
to accept a patent package was made by the Third Circuit in American
Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.41 The plaintiff-patentee had offered
defendant-manufacturer a license of certain patents. A royalty was stipu-
lated, based on the square feet of glass sold by the defendant, whether or
not any of the licensed patents were used in the manufacturing process.
Factually, the Securit case appears to coincide with Hazeltine, but there
was one important difference. Defendant, Shatterproof, had requested
some, but less than all of the patents included in the package offered by
the patentee; this was denied. Thus, the coercive element, fatally absent
in Hazeltine, was presented to the Court. If the defendant wished to secure
a license of some of the plaintiff's patents, he was compelled to accept a
group of them.
The court cited, and followed, the Paramount case. It analogized the
practice to "tie-in" arrangements, declaring that, in principle, an attempt
to control other patented articles and an attempt to control an unpatented
article were indistinguishable; both are misuse. "Each patent gives its
owner a monopoly in respect to its disclosure, so much and no more."'42
B. Theoretical and Practical Rationales
The condemnation of mandatory package licensing as a misuse of the
patent monopoly is logically founded. The patent owner is using the desired
patent as leverage to require his licensee to accept unneeded or unwanted
39. 339 U.S. at 830-31.
40. After the Hazeltine decision, many cases contained dicta that compulsary
package licensing was a misuse. Apex Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Altorfer Bros., 238 F.2d 867,
872 (7th Cir. 1956), reversing, 130 F. Supp. 152 (S.D. Ill. 1955) ; Hazeltine Research,
Inc. v. Avco Mfg. Corp., 227 F.2d 137, 147-49 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
987 (1956) ; Williams v. Hughes Tool Co., 186 F.2d 278, 285 (10th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 903 (1951) ; Carter Products v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 164
F. Supp. 503, 525-26 (D. Md. 1958) ; Houdry Process Corp. v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
121 F. Supp. 320, 321-22 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
Contra, Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. De Wald Radio Mfg. Corp., 226 App. Div.
1001, 95 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1st Dept. 1950). The New York appellate court held for
plaintiff even though coercion was shown. It is to be noted, however, that the opinion
relied on the Circuit Court's decision in the previous Hazeltine case, which thereafter
reached the Supreme Court. As already mentioned, that Court did not decide whether
coerced package licensing was a misuse. Supra note 34.
41. 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959), affirming 154 F. Supp. 890 (D. Del. 1957), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959) ; See 73 HARV. L. REv. 1628 (1960).
42. 268 F.2d at 777. As an alternative holding the court found for the defendant
on the basis that the patentee had violated a consent decree resulting from a previous
antitrust suit. This decree restrained the patentee from conditioning the license grant
upon the licensee's acceptance of other patents. Id. at 778.
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patents.43  The inherent monopoly power of the patent grant is being
expanded beyond its statutory scope to engulf other objects. This is the
essence of misuse.
The practical aspects of the Securit result are likewise desirable. By
accepting the license, the licensee acquiesces to the patent's validity and so
estops himself from later contesting it. 44 To permit mandatory package
licensing would be to permit the licensor to protect patents of doubtful
validity from challenge by the licensee. He could thus foist illegitimate
patent claims upon others. Because a substantial number of patents which
are awarded by the patent office, are unable to meet the judicial standards
of patentability, 45 a decision contrary to this could lead to a sizeable mis-
treatment of licensees as well as patents.
C. The Meaning of "Mandatory"
While it thus became an established legal principle that mandatory
package licensing is a misuse, the application of this principle still presents
difficulty. When is package licensing mandatory? Compulsion is clearly
present where the patentee refuses a request for a license of less than the
total package, 46 but in other cases, the presence or absence of coercion
is a very difficult factual determination.
A question, still unresolved by the courts, is whether coercion inheres
in a patent owner's offer to license less than the package but for the same
royalty as would be charged for the proposed package. The obvious answer
finds coercion. By his refusal to reduce rates proportionately with the
reduction of patents licensed, the patentee appears to be forcing more
patents into the license than the licensee desires. 47 Yet, a more penetrating
analysis would appear to undermine this conclusion. By accepting the
package, the licensee would estop himself from contesting the validity of
every patent in that group, including those not originally requested by him.
This may prove to be a very real hardship where the validity of these
additional patents is doubtful. The bribe, therefore, is not without its
burden; and a licensee, cognizant of this fact, will not be coerced by the
licensor's offer into accepting the complete package.
43. "Mandatory package licensing is no more than the exercise of the power
created by a particular patent monopoly to condition the licensing of that patent upon
the acceptance of another patent but that is too much. The protection, or monopoly,
which is given to the first patent stops where the monopoly of the second begins."
268 F.2d at 777.
44. E.g., United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310 (1904).
45. Stedman, Invention and Public Property, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 649,
657 (1947).
46. "Package licensing should be prohibited only where there is refusal, after a
request, to license less than a complete package." REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN'Ls NAT'L
COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 239-40 (1955).
47. Accord, American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 154 F. Supp. 890,
895 (D. Del.), aff'd, 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959); REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN'LS
NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 240 (1955).
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IV.
CONCLUSION
The manufacture of any modern complex article will usually require
the use of several patented articles. Research organizations, because of their
expertise in a narrow area, often possess patents controlling the entire
field 48 in which the manufacturer is engaged. In these circumstances, logic
would dictate that the patentee could serve his own best interests by
executing a single license which includes all the necessary patents. Natur-
ally, the expiration dates of the included patents will differ. 49 Such a
transaction is package licensing, which may become mandatory, and royalty
payments will be due under a contract which extends beyond the termina-
tion of some of the patents. Post-expiration royalties thus become a threat
in the same contract. For these reasons, the two misuses are often inti-
mately connected in practice. 50
In this area, the licensing of many complicated and entangled patents
as a package, 5 should not find refuge from the sanctions of the misuse
doctrine merely by reason of the complexity and entanglement. This
philosophy appeared in the logical declaration that mandatory package
licensing was a patent misuse. However, in designating a patentee's
activity a misuse, the court should exercise caution lest blindly applied
theory lead them to condemn practices which can be easily circumvented
by the use of certain legal methods. In such a case, the decree, in effect,
has demanded only formal compliance with the law; the designation of post-
expiration royalties as an abuse of the patent grant has left this result.
Thomas C. Siekrnan
48. The plaintiff, Hazeltine Research, Inc., in the Supreme Court Hazeltine case
licensed a package of 570 patents and 200 applications "related to the manufacture of
radio broadcasting apparatus. Respondent [plaintiff] and its corporate affiliate and
predecessor have for some twenty years been engaged in research, development, engi-
neering design and testing and consulting services in the radio field." Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 829 (1950).
49. Such an agreement could have many convenient aspects for the contracting
parties: complex bookkeeping would be avoided; some troublesome questions of in-
fringement which arise because the manufacturer-licensee, producing articles very
close to those patented but unlicensed, may overstep his license and infringement could
be evaded; the difficulty of determining an infringement in these circumstances where
articles, very similar to patented ones, are being manufactured is also circumvented;
complementary patents if licensed together obviate infringement trouble caused by the
licensing of only one of these patents.
However, because the public interest in stimulating invention and obtaining dis-
closure of scientific advancements, and not the inventors reward is dominant in the
patent system "convenience cannot justify an extension of the monopoly of the patent."
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 834 (1950).
Thus package licensing contracts must be kept within the law of misuse.
50. The license in the Securit case is an example. As well as demanding that
the licensee take all the offered patents, Securit's standard licensing agreement, para-
graph 8(a), had this provision: "that agreement shall continue, in full force and effect
to the expiration of the last to expire of any, of Securit's patents .. " American
Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769, 777 (3d Cir. 1959).
51. E.g., the 570 patents and 200 applications in Hazeltine's package license
covering the radio broadcasting field.
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